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Abstract 
Objectives: Many studies have demonstrated that theory of mind (ToM) ability declines with increasing 
age. Research has found that ToM-age associations are often mediated by other cognitive abilities 
particularly executive function. However, older adults rarely complain about real-world ToM difficulties. 
It has been suggested that older adults may perform better in real-world situations compared to 
experimental settings.  
Methods: We examined performance on the Strange Stories Film Task (SSFT) which has been designed 
to assess ToM using naturalistic, video scenarios. Sixty adults aged between 17-95 years old completed 
the SSFT, inhibitory control (Stroop) and working memory (Letter-Number Sequencing) measures, the 
basic empathy scale (cognitive and affective empathy), and the broad autism phenotype questionnaire.  
Results: ToM performance correlated significantly with age, whereas performance on a control task did 
not. Partial correlations and stepwise regression analyses demonstrated that performance on the three 
SSFT ToM measures was explained by a combination of executive function and empathy measures, with 
age explaining none of the variance.   
Conclusions: Using a naturalistic test of ToM, performance was shown to decline with age for ToM but 
not control scenarios. Across the lifespan, the variance in ToM performance was explained by cognitive 
abilities and empathy but not age. Age alone may not influence ToM ability, but may be associated with 
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Public Significance 
Older age is associated with poorer ability to understand the mental states of others, although older 
adults ready complain about the quality of their social interactions. Using a video task of real- world 
scenarios, we found that although poorer theory of mind ability was associated with older age, 
performance was explained by other cognitive abilities. Age-related cognitive difficulties rather than age 
alone may explain changes in understanding others in later life.  
 
 
Key words:  Empathy; Executive Function; Lifespan; Social Cognition; Theory of Mind. 
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Introduction 
Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to to attribute mental states, for example to recognize that others 
may have beliefs or desires that differ from one’s own (Flavell, 1999). Basic ToM develops in childhood, 
with explicit tests such as false belief tasks being passed around 4 years and implicit tasks (e.g. 
anticipatory looking based on attributed belief) in the second year of life.   More complex understanding 
of others’ mental states (e.g. recognizing the difference between irony and lying) continues to develop 
through childhood (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). ToM is thought to be stable in adulthood 
but it has seldom been examined across the adult lifespan, although a greater number of studies have 
examined ToM in later life (see Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013 for a review). ToM underlies 
successful social interactions and decline in this ability may impact social functioning giving rise to social 
isolation and loneliness. Therefore ToM difficulties may be particularly important in clinical populations 
and among older adults where social isolation has been shown to have a significant impact on health 
and well-being (Adams, Sanders, & Auth, 2004; Hawkley, Thisted, Masi, & Cacioppo, 2010).    
 
 The aspects of ToM that are measured, often differ across the lifespan but have generally 
focused on understanding social interactions and specifically the ability to attribute mental states. In 
childhood ToM is often examined using (1st-order) false belief tasks (the understanding that others may 
hold a different belief to oneself) (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). More complex attribution of false 
beliefs is measured using 2nd-order ('Jane thinks John thinks X') false belief tasks, often used with 
adolescents or adults (Happé, 1995). Other more advanced tests of mentalising have been developed for 
use with adult populations. These measures, including tasks such as the Strange Stories (Happé, 1994) or 
Frith-Happe Triangles (Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000), generally require interpretation of a 
protagonist’s intention regarding another's mental state, e.g. irony, persuasion, deception, white lies, 
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double-bluff, etc. Task success is generally measured by accurate attribution of characters' intentions. 
However, research has shown that some individuals with real-life ToM difficulties (e.g. individuals with 
autism spectrum disorders), often “pass” ToM test questions, suggesting that some lab-based measures 
are not sensitive to subtle real world difficulties (Scheeren, de Rosnay, Koot, & Begeer, 2013). The 
reason for this may be related to the speed and complexity of real world social interactions, where 
individuals must both interpret and react to events on a moment-by-moment basis (Scheeren et al., 
2013). The amount of Mental State Speech present in verbal responses has also been measured as an 
indirect metric of ToM ability (Happé, 1994). Studies have demonstrated reduced use of Mental State 
terms (despite correct interpretation of intention) in individuals with ToM difficulties (Happé, 1994). 
More recently ToM tasks have also begun to examine the ability to generate appropriate behaviour 
based on mental state attribution, e.g. when presented with an ambiguous scenario, “What would you 
do/say in that situation?” It is hoped that such tasks may more accurately reflect real world behaviours 
by measuring both understanding of the scenario and pro-social behaviours. Studies have identified 
poorer pro-social responses in individuals reporting more autistic traits, suggesting that this may reflect 
an additional aspect of ToM (Jameel, Vyas, Bellesi, Roberts, & Channon, 2014; Murray et al., 2017).  
 
When ToM has been examined across the adult lifespan, objective measures show mixed 
results. Duval et al. (2011) found no age effects from young to middle adulthood, but significantly 
poorer performance in older adults on an attribution of intention task and 2nd-order  false belief tasks. 
They further found that age had a direct effect on 2nd-order false belief performance, whereas the 
association between age and 1st-order false belief performance was mediated by executive function. In 
contrast Bernstein et al. (2011), using a continuous performance false belief task found greater false 
belief bias in middle-aged and older adults compared to young adults, as well as a general reduction in 
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ToM performance from young to old age. In a subsequent regression analysis, executive function, 
working memory, episodic memory and processing speed all failed to explain any additional variance in 
false belief performance beyond age effects. Although these studies used different measures and 
analyses, the contrast in results is still striking, with one study demonstrating middle-aged adults 
perform like young adults (Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache, & Desgranges, 2011) and the other 
demonstrating they perform like older adults (Bernstein, Thornton, & Sommerville, 2011); in one study 
age-ToM associations are affected by cognitive abilities (Duval et al., 2011) and in the other they are 
independent (Bernstein et al., 2011). There are notable differences in the ages of the groups used in 
these studies (mean age difference between young-middle groups, Duval et al. = 29 years, Bernstein et 
al. = 37 years; mean age difference between middle-old groups, Duval et al. = 18 years, Bernstein et al. = 
11 years) and many analyses used age-group rather than age as a continuous variable. Age differences 
and arbitrary age groupings may have influenced the different patterns of results by emphasising group 
differences without considering the continuous nature of age.     
 
More consistent results have been observed examining ToM performance in later life. Many 
studies have demonstrated poorer ToM abilities in older compared to younger adults even when 
accounting for intelligence or other cognitive abilities (Charlton, Barrick, Markus, & Morris, 2009; 
Rakoczy, Harder-Kasten, & Sturm, 2012). Furthermore a meta-analysis including a range of different 
ToM measures, supported poorer performance in later-life and a moderate effect size across all 
measures (Henry et al., 2013). It is worth noting that several studies have found equivalent performance 
between older and younger adults (Saltzman, Strauss, Hunter, & Archibald, 2000; Keightley, Winocur, 
Burianova, Hongwanishkul, & Grady, 2006). Only one paper has demonstrated superior performance 
among older versus young adults (Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998); the authors note, however, that 
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the young and old groups were not IQ-matched, and it seems likely that selection effects explain this 
result. Many studies have demonstrated that age-ToM associations are partly or fully mediated by other 
cognitive abilities, with some variability in results that may be due to the specific cognitive ability 
(Charlton et al., 2009; Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, & Taylor, 2002; Rakoczy et al., 2012). Working memory 
and inhibitory control have been described as core deficits in ageing (Charlton, Barrick, Lawes, Markus, 
& Morris, 2010; Hasher & Zacks, 1988), and previous studies have suggested that these abilities may 
influence ToM performance (Charlton et al., 2009; Maylor et al., 2002; Rakoczy et al., 2012; Henry et al., 
2013). Furthermore, the task demands of many ToM tests require working memory abilities (holding 
information in mind, evaluating it and then generating a response), and inhibitory control (inhibiting 
responses based on own knowledge in order to answer test questions about a character's false belief). 
In a typical ageing population, seven (out of eight) executive function tests correlated significantly with 
ToM performance, including domains of working memory and inhibitory control (Charlton et al., 2009). 
Robust correlations between ToM and executive function abilities have also been noted both in age-
related disease such as stroke (Pluta, Gawron, Sobanska, Wojcik, & Lojek, 2017). Research suggests an 
important role for executive function abilities in ToM performance across the adult lifespan, but it is not 
clear whether ToM performance is affected by age directly or by age-related changes in other cognitive 
domains. Understanding the mechanism for age-related changes in ToM abilities will allow us to 
intervene to reduce social problems and social isolation that has a significant negative impact in older 
age (Bailey, Henry, & Von, 2008). To date few studies have directly examined the influence of other 
socio-cognitive abilities such as emotional empathy on ToM performance in ageing.  
 
In recent years the distinction has been made between ‘cognitive’ and ‘affective’ ToM (Duval et 
al., 2011; Mitchell & Phillips, 2015), that is between attribution of mental states and affective empathy 
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for others' feelings. Cognitive ToM has been described as the cognitive understanding of the beliefs and 
intentions of others, whereas affective ToM has been described as requiring empathic understanding of 
others’ emotions (Mitchell & Phillips, 2015). These definitions often overlap with descriptions of 
cognitive and affective empathy. Empathy is often described as an emotional response relating to 
someone else’s affective state, with cognitive empathy being the representation of others’ mental 
states (i.e. ToM) and affective empathy being the recognition of and response to others’ emotions (Blair, 
2005). Although different aspects of empathy are often strongly associated with each other, they may 
also dissociate particularly in clinical populations including autism spectrum disorders (Sucksmith, 
Allison, Baron-Cohen, Chakrabarti, & Hoekstra, 2013). For example, although studies have identified 
difficulty with cognitive empathy/ToM in individuals with autism spectrum disorders, many have found 
no difficulties in affective empathy (Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit, 2007). Furthermore 
ToM and empathy have been shown to dissociate in other neurodevelopmental groups (e.g. Conduct 
disorder with callous/unemotional traits versus ASD; Jones, Happé, Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 2010). 
The presence of neurodevelopmental traits (e.g. the broad autism phenotype, BAP) is significantly 
associated with emotional empathy abilities in relatives of individuals with autism spectrum disorders 
and the general population (Grove, Baillie, Allison, Baron-Cohen, & Hoekstra, 2014; Lamport & Turner, 
2014). However, few studies have examined relationships between ToM, affective empathy and traits 
associated with the BAP in ageing (Bailey et al., 2008; Mitchell & Phillips, 2015). To our knowledge one 
study has examined the relationship between ToM and cognitive versus affective empathy. Bailey et al. 
(2008) demonstrated that older adults performed significantly worse than young adults on an affective 
ToM task (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), as 
well as reporting poorer cognitive empathy on a self-report questionnaire. However, no age differences 
were observed on self-reported affective empathy. In other studies of cognitive versus affective abilities 
in old age, findings are mixed.  Bottirolli et al. (2016) demonstrated poorer performance for older adults 
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(compared to young adults) on a cognitive but not affective ToM measure (a Faux Pas task designed to 
include both cognitive and affective measures). However other studies have also identified age-effects 
on affective ToM measures (Mahy et al., 2014; Duval et al., 2011). Overall, these results suggest there 
may be a different pattern of age-related decline in cognitive versus affective abilities.  
 
An important consideration when discussing ToM across the neurotypical lifespan, is that any 
differences or difficulties in performance are likely to be small in comparison to clinical disorders 
associated with ToM difficulties (i.e. Autism Spectrum Disorders; or Schizophrenia). Indeed, even among 
clinical groups, individuals may perform well on lab-based tests despite difficulties in the real world 
(Murray et al., 2017). In order to detect the subtle differences in performance that are likely to occur 
across the lifespan we require measures that are both sensitive and ecologically valid. It has been 
suggested that video-based tasks may overcome some of the difficulties with traditional lab-based tasks 
(Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 2000; Murray et al., 2017; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). The 
advantage of videos is that they allow the dynamic presentation of complex scenes with multiple 
sources of information that may be both subtle and fleeting. In this study we utilise a recently developed 
video ToM task (the Strange Stories Film Task, SSFT) designed to assess ToM in a naturalistic manner in 
adults (Murray et al., 2017). The SSFT was developed based on the Strange Stories Task (Happé, 1994), 
as a series of video scenarios showing the same two characters and requiring interpretation of speaker’s 
intention and generation of an appropriate response (see Methods section for a more detailed 
description; full details of development can be found in Murray et al. (2017)). The SSFT includes 
assessment of several different aspects of ToM; i) correct identification of the intention of a character, ii) 
measurement of use of mental state speech, and iii) correct generation of a suitable social interaction. 
Understanding others’ mental states, such as intentions is the core feature of ToM according to most 
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definitions (Mitchell & Phillips, 2015), and mental state speech has been used as an index of a 
participants ability to think about others’ mental states (Happé, 1994). Less widely used are questions 
requiring a response describing an interaction, where a participant must generate their “own” social 
response to each scenario. A previous study has shown that individuals reporting high autistic traits 
responded less pro-socially to scenarios (Jameel et al., 2014), thus this measure may be a useful 
reflection of real world behaviour. By using a test that mimics real world social situations, measuring 
multiple aspects of ToM we hope to better understand the subtle changes in ToM across the lifespan.  
 
Given that “cognitive empathy” has been shown to mediate age-social functioning associations 
(Bailey et al., 2008) and the known negative consequences of social isolation in ageing (Blozik et al., 
2009), understanding these associations may inform well-being in older age. In this study we examined 
ToM performance cross-sectionally across the adult lifespan using a naturalistic measure. We further 
examined associations between ToM performance with age, executive function abilities (specifically 
working memory and inhibitory control), cognitive and affective empathy. We hypothesise that ToM 
performance will decline with increasing age, but that this will be explained by age-related declines in 
domain-general cognitive abilities. We hypothesize that ToM performance will be associated with self-




Sixty adults aged 17-95 (M=44, SD=18.5) were recruited to participate in the study. One participant 
(aged over sixty) was excluded from the analyses, having had a stroke that significantly influenced his 
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cognitive ability. On the Stroop task (see below) he performed more than two standard deviations below 
the mean of his age group, and was excluded from the analysis. Demographic data on the remaining 59 
participants are presented in Table 1 where the sample has been divided into three age groups for 
descriptive purposes, although age is used as a continuous variable in all analysis. All participants 
provided written informed consent. After the study, all participants were debriefed both verbally and via 
a written debrief form. The study was approved by Goldsmiths University of London Ethics Committee. 
Younger participants (aged 17-34 years) were students from Goldsmiths University. Twenty students 
were from the Department of Psychology and were assigned student research participation credits. 
Middle-aged (n=20; aged 35-59 years) participants were recruited at random from a cafe in South-east 
London. Participants were given a hot drink as a thank you for their participation. Older participants 
(aged 60-95 years) were recruited from an elderly independent housing community in the London 
Borough of Camden.  The community offers housing opportunities for older adults with a low income, 
where people live independently in an apartment within a block for older adults. Participants aged over 
60 years old were screened for risk for dementia using the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein, 
Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). All older participants scored above the cut-off of 24 ruling out likely 
dementia (Mean=28.53, SD=1.3; Tombaugh & McIntyre, 1992). All participants were fluent in English, 
any non-native speaker had lived in the UK for at least 10 years. None of the participants reported 
problems with hearing and all had corrected-to-normal or normal vision. Participants were tested in a 
quiet environment in their own homes, in a quiet room in the café or in a laboratory at Goldsmiths 
University. All participants were tested independently in the company of the experimenter.  
 
Materials 
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Strange Stories Film Task. The Strange Stories Film task (SSFT; Murray et al., 2017) was used to 
assess ToM and social cognition in a naturalistic manner. The SSFT was developed and tested on 40 
adults (20 with autism spectrum disorders and 20 without). The SSFT comprised 15 short video clips 
acted by two semi-professional actors, using similar social scenarios as Happé’s Strange Stories (Happé, 
1994). Twelve scenarios involved mental states such as telling a white lie, using persuasion, or double 
bluff (henceforth referred to as ToM scenarios), and three were non-ToM scenarios (henceforth referred 
to as Control scenarios). The actors spoke directly to the camera, to mimic real world conversations 
from a first-person perspective. After watching each video clip participants were asked three questions 
examining Intention (i.e., Why did the character say that?), Interaction (ie If you were in the other 
character´s situation, what would you say next?), and a memory question to check for attention or gross 
memory difficulties (e.g., Where was the character?). Participants answered verbally and their responses 
were transcribed by the researcher. Intention questions were scored between 0-2 depending on 
accuracy and appropriateness; these responses were also coded for presence of mental state and 
metacognitive speech (0-2 points, henceforth “Mental State Speech”). Interaction questions were 
scored between 0-2 depending on appropriateness. The memory question was scored 0-1 for accuracy. 
The Intention question was designed to measure ToM, whereas the Interaction and Mental State Speech 
responses were intended to measure social cognition more broadly. All scoring followed guidelines in 
Murray et al (2017) and was performed by a single rater (EJN). To assess consistency of scoring, inter-
rater reliability was calculated with an experienced coder (RAC) and two other research assistants in the 
lab, using two-way random model intra-class correlations (absolute values) in IBM SPSS Statistics, 
version 22 (IBM Corp., 2013), all values were deemed good and were as follows: ToM- Intention, r=.962; 
ToM-Mental State Speech, r=.871; ToM-Interaction, r=.916; ToM-Memory, r=.969; Control-Intention, 
r=.894; Control -Mental State Speech, r=.907; Control –Interaction, r=.724; Control –Memory, no 
variance was  observed between raters.  
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The sensitivity of the SSFT has been reported previously in young adults and adults with ASD 
(Murray et al., 2017), but has not been widely used or used across the lifespan. For reference the 
reliability of the measure is reported here.  For the ToM scenarios Cronbach’s alphas were as follows: 
Intention (alpha =.57); Mental State Speech (alpha =.48); and Interaction (alpha =.55). For Memory 
questions there was very little variance in the data and Cronbach’s alphas were not deemed 
appropriate: for young and midlife adults most individuals scored at ceiling (maximum score=12, 
achieved by: young=19/20; midlife=18/20); for older adults results had only slightly more variance (8 
individuals scored=12; 7 scored=11; 3 scored=10; 1 scored=9). For the Control scenarios Cronbach’s 
alphas were robust for the Interaction scores (=.77), but much weaker for Mental State Speech (alpha =-
.001) and Intention (alpha =-.030); note however, that these variables were not intended to be 
meaningful for the control clips. Memory scores were at ceiling, with all but three individuals (two 
midlife, one older) achieving the maximum score. Scores from the current data are reported in Table 2.  
 
Cognitive and Empathy Measures. Inhibitory control was measured by the Stroop test (Golden, 
1978); completion time on the Colour-Ink subscale minus completion time for the Colour-Word subscale 
was used in the analysis therefore lower scores indicate better performance. Working memory was 
measured by the Letter-Number Sequencing task from the Wechsler’s Intelligence Test IV (Wechsler, 
2008); the total raw score was used in the analysis with higher scores indicating better performance. 
Raw scores (rather than age-corrected scores) were used for both cognitive measures in order to allow 
examination of age-effects. The Basic Empathy Scale (BES) was used to measure cognitive and affective 
empathy (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006), with questions such as “I’m not usually aware of my friend’s 
feelings”, and “I tend to feel scared when I’m with friends who are afraid” respectively. The Broad 
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Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ; Hurley, Losh, Parlier, Reznick, & Piven, 2007) was used to 
assess presence of autism traits. As traits are considered to vary across the population, participants with 
high scores were not excluded. For reference, six individuals scored above the suggested BAPQ cut-off 
(>3.35 for males and >3.25 for females; Hurley et al., 2007), three men (aged 37, 65, 95) and three 
women (aged 19, 20, 46), although it is worth noting that these cut-offs were developed in a sample of 
young and mid-life adults.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
Statistical analysis was performed using IBM SPSS Statistics, version 22 (IBM Corp., 2013). The 
relationship between age and ToM performance was investigated using Pearson’s product moment 
correlations. The associations between ToM performance, age, executive function abilities, cognitive 
and affective empathy were examined using Pearson’s product moment correlations. Stepwise linear 
regressions were used to examine which variables best explained the variance in each aspect of ToM 
ability measured by the SSFT. To assure that gender did not influence results, gender differences on SSFT 
measures were calculated using independent sample t-test. Multiple comparison correction was 
performed using the Holm-Bonferroni sequence correction.  
Results 
Age effects. For descriptive purposes, the means and standard deviations are presented by age-
group in Table 2. Mean scores for cognitive measures are reported in Table 1, no age-group differences 
are noted for the working memory (Letter-Number Sequencing) age-scaled scores but the non-age 
corrected difference between the Stroop Colour and Interference tasks demonstrate expected age 
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differences (slower performance with older age). Please note that age is used as a continuous variable in 
all analysis presented below. 
 
Gender differences. No gender differences were noted in highest education level, but were 
apparent in age, see Table 3. For the SSFT, gender differences were observed on ToM Intention and 
Mental State Speech , but no other measures. After correction for multiple comparisons, only ToM 
Intention ability was demonstrated significant gender differences. See Table 3 for full details. Women 
scored more highly on affective empathy (Women: mean=42.06, sd=6.90; Men: mean=37.74, sd=6.96; 
F=5.46, p=.023); but not cognitive empathy (Women: mean=38.06, sd=3.45; Men: mean=37.22, sd=4.83; 
F=.545, p=.464).  
 
Correlation Analyses. 
Age. Significant negative correlations were observed between age and each aspect of ToM (see 
Figure 1 and Table 4), indicating declining performance as age increases. All associations remained 
significant after controlling for multiple comparison correction. For Control SSFT scores, age correlated 
significantly with Mental State Speech and Interaction scores, but not with Intention or Memory scores; 
results did not survive multiple comparison correction.  
Age correlated significantly with performance on both inhibitory control (r=.729, p<.001) and 
working memory (r=-.373, p=.004). No significant correlations were observed between age and either 
affective (r=-.135, p=.310) or cognitive (r=-.039, p=.770) empathy, or BAP traits (r=-.176, p=.181).  
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BAP Traits. Self-reported BAP traits did not correlate significantly with any measure of ToM. 
However, partial correlations between BAP traits and ToM performance controlling for age, reveal a 
significant association between BAP traits and ToM Intention ability (see Table 4). Results did not survive 
multiple comparison correction. 
 
Cognitive function. All aspects of ToM performance (Intention, Mental State Speech, 
Interaction) correlated significantly with both inhibitory control and working memory measures, see 
Table 5. Results indicate better ToM performance was associated with better cognitive abilities. If age 
was controlled for in a partial correlational analysis the association between ToM performance and 
working memory remained significant.  
 
Empathy. ToM Intention ability correlated significantly with both cognitive and affective 
empathy, see Table 5. Mental State Speech correlated significantly with cognitive empathy but not 
affective empathy. No significant association was observed between ToM Interaction ability and either 
cognitive or affective empathy scores. The pattern of results remained the same if a partial correlation 
was performed controlling for age, see Table 5. Also see Table 5 for details of multiple comparison 
correction. Note, the correlation between cognitive and affective empathy was not significant (r=.215, 
p=.102), suggesting that these subscales measure different constructs.   
 
Regression Analysis. Forward stepwise regression analyses were performed with each aspect of 
ToM performance (Intention, Mental State Speech, Interaction) in turn as the dependent variable. 
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Included as independent variables were age, education, gender, working memory, inhibitory control, 
cognitive and affective empathy, and BAP traits. Full results are presented in Table 6.  
For ToM Intention, working memory, affective empathy, control and gender contributed to 
explaining 49.9% of the variance in performance. Age did not contribute to the model. For Mental State 
Speech, working memory, gender and cognitive empathy contributed, explaining 41.7% of the variance 
in performance. Variance in ToM Interaction ability (37.9%) was explained by performance in inhibitory 
control and education level. Memory performance on the ToM SSFT task (37.4%) was explained by age 
and working memory ability. See Table 5 for full details and statistics.  
 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine ToM abilities across the lifespan using a naturalistic video-
based test, and to examine associations with executive function, cognitive and affective empathy. In 
keeping with previous studies in ageing (Bottiroli, Cavallini, Ceccato, Vecchi, & Lecce, 2016; Henry et al., 
2013), all three ToM measures derived from the SSFT (and the memory question) correlated negatively 
with age. Despite using a measure designed to optimise ecologically validity, age-related declines in 
performance were still observed. In previous studies examining ToM across the lifespan, analyses have 
largely explored group differences between young, middle-aged and older adults, and have found age 
effects either before (Young>Mid-Iife=Old) or after (Young=Mid-Iife> Old) middle-age (Duval et al., 2011; 
Bernstein et al., 2011). In contrast, this study considered age as a continuous variable and significant 
correlations were noted between the three aspects of ToM measured and age (see Figure 1). No 
correlations with age were observed for either cognitive or affective empathy, suggesting that self-
reported empathy is not associated with age. This finding is in keeping with a previous study which 
examined cognitive and affective ToM, which found no age-associations on self-reported cognitive or 
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affective measures (Duval et al., 2011). However another study described older adults as self-reporting 
lower scores on cognitive empathy compared to young adults, but no age-group differences on self-
report affective empathy (Bailey et al., 2008).    
 
Some authors consider cognitive empathy and ToM to be synonymous (Mitchell & Phillips, 
2015) but if they are then there are discrepancies in the age effects observed in this study, with age 
effects observed on “objective” task performance (SSFT performance) but not “subjective” self-report 
measures (BES). In the current study, on the objective measure, ToM Intention and Mental State Speech 
did correlate significantly with the subjective self-report measure of cognitive empathy, but only 
modestly (r≈.3) and no correlation was observed between self-report cognitive empathy and ToM 
Interaction ability. Furthermore subjectively reported affective empathy significantly correlated with 
objectively measured ToM Intention ability, but not the other two ToM measures (Mental State Speech 
or Interaction).  Similar results to those found here were identified in a previous study, where no 
significant correlations were noted between objective and subjective ToM measures (Duval et al., 2011). 
These results may suggest that perhaps cognitive empathy and ToM do not measure the same 
underlying construct, although they may share key components (Mitchell & Phillips, 2015). Alternatively, 
results could reflect discrepancies between objective tasks performance versus subjective self-report 
measures (usually questionnaires), where individuals may under-estimate their difficulties, or perhaps 
objective lab-based measures are more strongly influenced by cognitive demands than everyday life 
social skills, the latter reflected in better self-reported abilities.  
 
Interestingly, this study did not identify significant correlations between the three aspects of 
ToM measured and BAP traits, although once age-effects were accounted for ToM Intention correlated 
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significantly with BAP traits. This finding is very similar to that of Murray et al. (2017) who found that 
ToM Intention performance correlated significantly with Autism Quotient scores in typical young adults, 
although the association did not reach the high significance level imposed (p<.01). These findings may 
reflect the fact that although ToM difficulties reflect the core social communication feature in ASD, they 
are not the only important diagnostic characteristic.  
 
The results of both the correlation and regression analyses suggest that executive function and 
empathy explain a proportion of the variance in ToM performance, whereas age does not contribute 
statistically to the regression models. Results suggests that working memory contributes to ToM 
performance across the lifespan, not just in ageing. However, the association between ToM 
performance and inhibitory control no longer reached significance after controlling for age. Although 
age correlated significantly with ToM abilities, it was not the most important metric for explaining 
performance. ToM Intention was explained by working memory, affective empathy and gender; and 
ToM Interactions by inhibitory control and education. Variance in Mental State Speech was explained by 
working memory, gender and cognitive empathy. Age did not contribute to explaining the variance on 
any of the measure of ToM. Only for the memory component of ToM did age explain a large proportion 
of the variance in performance. Although some previous studies have found that age-ToM associations 
remain after taking into account executive function (Bernstein et al., 2011; Bottiroli et al., 2016; Maylor 
et al., 2002), others have found that executive function mediates age-ToM associations (Bailey & Henry, 
2008; Charlton et al., 2009; Duval et al., 2011; Rakoczy et al., 2012). Results from this study support the 
importance of executive function abilities for ToM performance, not only in ageing but across the adult 
lifespan. Few studies have explicitly assessed the impact of both executive function and empathy on 
ToM across the lifespan (Duval et al., 2011). The results of this study suggest that cognition and empathy 
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both contribute to ToM performance, and the results of the partial correlations controlling for age 
suggest that these abilities are important not just in ageing but across the adult lifespan. 
 
Results of this study should be considered keeping in mind some limitations. Recruitment 
occurred in different settings depending on age (young adults were predominantly university students, 
whereas middle-aged adults were recruited at a café, and older adults at an independent residential 
association), and this may lead to sampling biases. As in many ageing studies, the older individuals who 
participated were relatively healthy, with 8 taking 1-2 medications and only 1 taking three or more 
medications. This compares to UK national statistics showing 88% of those aged over 65 take at least 
one medication, and 68% take at least three medications (Scholes, Faulding, & Mindell, 2014). This 
suggests that this community housing sample are not unusually unwell for their age. Age differences 
were also noted between men and women. We focused on two aspects of executive function (inhibitory 
control and working memory), but future studies may benefit from examining the contribution of other 
aspects of executive function and a formal measure of episodic memory.  In addition, this study used a 
recently developed, novel ToM task. Although our study demonstrates a pattern of results similar to 
studies using more established measures and a previous study has demonstrated convergent validity for 
ToM SSFT Intention scores compared to the widely used Strange Stories task (Murray et al., 2017), we 
did not include a comparison ToM measure in this study. In future studies it would be useful to compare 
the SSFT to established ToM measures. Another potential limitation of the SSFT task across the lifespan 
is the use of young actors in the scenarios. Previous research has demonstrated own-age biases in 
recognition memory tasks, but the effect of own-age biases in attention is less clear (Harrison & Hole, 
2009). Future task development could expand the scenarios to include actors across a wider age-range, 
to allow the examination of possible own-age biases. Furthermore, as the SSFT was designed as an 
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ecologically valid measure, future studies could assess real-life ToM abilities through self and other-
report, to examine whether the SSFT is providing information valid to the real-world.  
 
In summary, in this lifespan study of ToM we found that even using a test designed to have 
ecological validity, performance on ToM measures was negatively associated with age. However ToM 
performance was largely explained by executive function and empathy, rather than age. Results suggest 
that age-related ToM changes may be due to other cognitive and socio-cognitive changes rather than 
age alone. This suggests that declines in ToM performance, associated difficulties in social interaction 
and possible sequelae of social isolation, may not be inevitable in ageing. By supporting cognitive 
functions it may be possible to reduce the impact of ToM changes in later life.  Further studies are 
required to fully understand the associations between socio-cognitive and social functions across the 
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Figure Headings  
 
Figure 1. Scatterplots showing correlations between age and SSFT Intention, Mental State Speech and Interaction scores.  
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Table 1: Means (and standard deviations) for demographic data divided by age-group for descriptive 
purposes only. 






Age  21 (4.17) 44 (8.40) 70 (8.0) 
Gender (Women:Men) 17:3 9:11 10:10 
Education a 3.35 (0.58) 4.30 (0.98) 2.84 (1.30) 




Medication frequency c No medication use  2 people taking 1-2 
medications 
8 people taking 1-2 
medications; 1 person 
taking three or more 
medications 
BAPQ d 99.29 (18.52) 95.50 (22.33) 88.05 (25.49) 
MMSE  e - - 28.53 (1.30)  
Range 26-30 
Letter-Number Sequencing 
Scaled Score f 
10.45 (2.31) 11.40 (2.66) 10.95 (1.99) 
Stroop Difference in 
Seconds (Interference-
Colour) g  
45 (14) 67 (18) 109 (34) 
a Education level: 0 = Left school, 1 = Vocational qualification including apprenticeships, 2 = General 
Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE, UK exams at 16 years old), 3 = Advanced-level (A-level, UK 
exams at 18 years old, 4 = Undergraduate Degree, 5 = Postgraduate Degree, 6 = PhD or higher 
b Mental health problems: 0= Never, 1= One occasion, 2= Two-three occasions, 3= More than three 
occasions 
c Current medication: 0=None, 1= One/Two, 2= Three or more  
d BAPQ= Score on the Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (Max: 216) 
e MMSE, Mini Mental State Examination, only performed for adults aged over 60 years old 
f F=.825, p=.444  
g F=39.1, p<.001 
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Control group means (Mean 
age=30.6, n=20) from Murray 
et al., 2017 
ToM      
Intention (Max: 24) 19.70 (2.72) 18.80 (2.07) 17.16 (3.66) 18.58 (3.01) 18.80 (2.33) 
Mental State Talk (Max: 24) 12.75 (2.72) 10.95 (2.16) 10.00 (3.09) 11.25 (2.87) 13.75 (2.45) 
Interaction (Max: 24) 17.35 (2.50) 17.55 (2.78) 14.47 (2.80) 16.49 (3.00) 16.95 (4.14) 
Memory (Max: 12) 11.95 (0.22) 11.90 (0.31) 11.16 (0.90) 11.68 (0.66) 11.85 (0.37) 
Control      
Intention (Max: 6) 4.15 (0.81) 4.85 (0.93) 4.53 (1.02) 4.51 (0.95) 4.40 (0.99) 
Mental State Talk (Max: 6) 1.20 (1.01) 1.15 (1.04) 0.74 (0.65) 1.03 (0.93) 1.25 (1.16) 
Interaction (Max: 6) 5.05 (1.39) 5.35 (0.99) 4.21 (1.27) 4.88 (1.30) 5.70 (0.65) 
Memory (Max: 3) 3.00 (0) 2.90 (0.31) 2.95  (0.23) 2.95 (0.22)  3.00 (0)  
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Table 3: Means and standard deviations by gender, and group differences.  
 Males  Females Group differences  
Age 53.48, (sd=17.7) 39.06 (sd=21.1) t=-2.72, p=.009 ± 
Highest Education 
level 
3.52 (1.34) 3.50 (1.03)   t=-.070, p=.944 
ToM SSFT scores    
Intention 17.09, (sd=2.9) 19.53 (sd=2.7) t=3.28 p=.002 ± 
Mental State Talk 10.17, (sd=2.4) 11.94 (sd=2.9), t=2.41, p=.019 * 
Interaction 15.83, (sd=3.4) 16.92 (sd=2.7) t=1.37p=.175 
Memory  11.48, (sd=.85) 11.81 (sd=.47) t=1.70, p=.100 
Control SSFT scores    
Intention 4.65, (sd=.98) 4.42 (sd=.94) t=-.914, p=.365 
Mental State Talk 1.0, (sd=.85) 1.06 (sd=.98) t=.222, p=.825 
Interaction 4.65, (sd=1.4) 5.03 (sd=1.2) t=1.08, p=.283 
Memory  2.96, (sd=.219) 2.94 (sd=.23) t=-.202, p=.840 
* p<.05, ± p<.001; Bold = remains significant after multiple comparison testing.
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Table 4: Correlations between SSFT scores and age and BAPQ scores.  
 
 Correlations with Age  Correlations with BAPQ Correlations with BAPQ 
controlling for Age 
ToM SSFT scores    
Intention r=-.441, p<.001 ± r=-.210, p=.111 r=-.325, p=.013 
Mental State Talk r=-.452, p<.001 ± r=-.117, p=.377 r=-.224, p=.090 
Interaction r=-.464, p<.001 ± r=-.072, p=.588 r=-.176, p=.186 
Memory  r=-.556, p<.001 ± r=-.043, p=.748 r=-.172, p=.196 
Control SSFT scores    
Intention r=.033, p=.802 r=-.066, p=.619 r=-.061, p=.648 
Mental State Talk r=-.259, p=.048 * r=-.042, p=.751 r=-.092, p=.490 
Interaction r=-.318, p=.014 * r=.069, p=.603 r=.014, p=.917 
Memory  r=-.056, p=.674 r=-.048, p=.717 r=-.059, p=.659 
* p<.05, ± p<.001 Bold = remains significant after multiple comparison testing. 
 
 
Theory of Mind across the adult lifespan 
 
Table 5: Correlations (and age corrected partial correlations) between ToM SSFT scores and cognitive and 
empathy measures  
 
 ToM Intention ToM Mental State 
Speech 
ToM Interaction 
Executive Control  r=-.438, p=.001 ± 
(r=-.189, p=.156) 
r=-.389, p=.002 † 
(r=-.098, p=.466) 
r=-.472, p<.001 ± 
(r=-.222, p=.094) 
Working Memory  r=.495, p<.001 ± 
(r=.396, p=.002 †) 
r=.538, p<.001 ± 
(r=.446, p<.001 ±) 
r=.392, p=.002 † 
(r=.266, p=.044 *) 
Cognitive Empathy  r=.312, p=.016 
(r=.329, p.=012 *) 
r=.288, p=.027 * 
(r=.303, p=.021 *) 
r=.137, p=.301 
(r=.134, p=.315) 
Affective Empathy  r=.394, p=.002 





* p<.05,† p<.01, ± p<.001; Age-corrected correlations in parenthesis. Bold = remains significant after 




Theory of Mind across the adult lifespan 
 
Table 6: Results for forward stepwise regression analyses for each SSFT ToM score.  
 Standardised Coefficients 
- Beta weights 
% variance explained ANOVA 
Intention  Total = 49.9% F=18.29, p<.001 ± 
Working memory Beta=.509, p<.001 24.5%  
Affective empathy Beta=.348, p=.001 18.5%  
Gender Beta=-.277, p=.008 7%  
Mental State Speech  Total = 41.7% F=13.13, p<.001 ± 
Working memory Beta=.510, p<.001 28.9%  
Gender Beta=-.264, p=.014 7.2%  
Cognitive empathy Beta=.219, p=.039 4.5%  
Interaction   Total = 37.9% F=17.11, p<.001 ± 
Executive control Beta=-.465, p<.001 28.5%  
Education Beta=.315, p=.005 9.4%  
Memory  Total = 37.4% F=16.71, p<.001 ± 
Age Beta=-.454, p<.001 30.9%  
Working Memory  Beta=.273, p=.020 6.4%  
± p<.001 
Independent variables entered into models were: age, education, gender, working memory, inhibitory 
control, cognitive and affective empathy, and BAP traits. 
 
 
 
